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Summary  findings
Economic  policymakers  traditionally  hold  the view  that,  The  results  are not  conclusive,  but  seem  to support
because  of  imperfectioms  in capital  markets,  a shortage  of  conventional  beliefs about  the importance  of long-term
long-terrn  finance  acts .-s a barrier  to industrial  finance  to firm  performance.  Heavy  leveraging,
performance  and  growth.  ILong-term finance  is thought  however,  has a strong  negative  impact  on  productivity.
to allow  fhrmn to  invest  in more  productive  technologies,  They  base their  econometric  evidence  on estimates  of a
even when  they do  not  produce  immediate  payoffs,  maturity  equation  and  of a production  function
without  the fear  oi premature  liquidation.  As a result,  augmented  by financial  variables.
special  state-supported  term-lendirng  institutions  have  The  data  on which  these  results  are based  have been
been  established,  especially  in developing  countries.  generated  by a financial  system  in which  there  is little
But sonic  believe  that  short-term  finance  may offer  competition,  in which  state-owned  financial  institutions
better  incenrivcs  because  it allows  suppliers  of finance  to  are  not  guided  by the  profit  motive  and  have no control
monitor  and  montrol firms  mnore  effectively,  thus  over  interest  rates,  so one cannot  say whether  short  term
improving  the  firms'  performance.  finance  would  have been  more  beneficial  in a less
Schiant,;  -rh, aind Si ivis-lava en-pirically  investigate  the  regulated  system.
deterrlinaiits  and Lonseqoences  of the term  structure  of  Moreover,  by the  end  of the 1980s,  the capital  base of
debt.  Using a rich p.ncl  of data  on privately  owned  India's  government-owned  financial  institutions  had been
cornpanits  in India,  tl-ev also  examine  the influence  of  severely  eroded  and  they  carried  a heavy  burden  of
debt  manu-ity  strictures  oIn  those  firms'  performance,  nonperforming  assets.  This  means  that  the benefits  of
especially  on productivity  long term  finance  must  be weighed  against  the costs.
This  paper  --  a prod;  ct  of the  Finance  and  Private  Sector  Development  Division,  Policy  Research  Department  - was
prepared  for tlc  conferernce  "Firm  Finance:  Theory  and  Evidence,"  Finance  and  Private  Sector  Development  Division,
Policy  Research  Departinent,  June  14, 1996.  The  study  was funded  by the  Bank's Research  Support  Budget  under
research  project  'Term  F.nance"  (RPO  679-62).  Copies  of this  paper  are available  free from  the  World  Bank,  1818  H
Street  NW,  Washington  DC  20433-0001.  Please  contact  Bill Moore,  room  N9-038,  telephone  202-473-8526,  fax
202-522-1  155,  internet  address  gmoore@worldbank.org.  February  1997.  (29  pages)
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Economic  policy  makers have  traditionally  held the  view  that,  due  to  capital  market
imperfections,  there is a shortage of long term finance and that this acts as a barrier to industrial
performance and growth. This belief has led to the establishment of special term lending institutions
often supported by governments and other agencies, particularly in developing countries. Long tern
finance is thought to allow firms to invest in more productive technologies, even when they do not
provide an  immediate payoff, without the fear of premature liquidation.  However,  short term
finance may have better incentive properties compared with long term finance, because it allows
suppliers of finance to monitor and control firms more effectively, with favourable effects on  firms'
performance.
Although progress has been made in investigating the nature of capital market imperfections,
which  state  interventions  are  supposed  to  provide  a  remedy  for, the  consequences  of  these
interventions on firms' behaviour and performance have not been as thoroughly analysed. Ultimately
the twin issues of the determinants and the consequences of the maturity structure of debt cannot be
satisfactorily resolved at the theoretical level. An empirical analysis of these issues is both justified
and necessary.  Using data from a panel of Indian public limited companies for the period 1980-89
this paper empirically examines the determinants of the maturity structure of debt held by firms and
the consequences of maturity on their performance, in particular on their productivity.
This study is, in our view, particularly interesting for the following reasons.  Firstly, India
during the period of the study had a repressed financial system where financial institutions were
largely government owned and a major portion of credit was allocated according to state policy. This
was a typical situation in LDC's before the introduction  of financial liberalization measures in the 80's
and early 90's. In India significant reforms of the financial system have taken place since 1991, but2
we are not in a position to analyse the consequences of these changes as firm level data are not yet
available for this period.  Secondly, the sheer size of India's economy makes an understanding  of
its experience very valuable. Finally, the panel data set that we have access to is unique in that it has
firm level information on the sources of long term debt.  It enables us to distinguish between long
term finance from Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) and from market and other sources. This
allows us to separately assess the effects of long term credit according to whether it is provided
through the market and other sources or through financial intermediaries.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a background for the paper with
a brief description  of the financial system in India during the period of the study.  Section III
describes the data and presents aggregate summary descriptive statistics.  Section IV presents the
empirical  findings  regarding the determinants of  maturity, and  Section V  those regarding the
relationship between debt structure and productivity.  The last section draws conclusions based on
the study.
II.  Institutional Framework and Structure of Financial Markets  1950-90
In India, at the time  of independence, the market for industrial securities was not well
developed  and commercial banks were the only important financial intermediaries involved in
industrial financing.  At the time commercial banks provided only short term finance for working
capital purposes.  In 1958 commercial banks began to undertake some term lending activities, and
provide medium term finance which was re-financed by a special institution set up for the purpose'.
I  The Re-finance  Corporation  for Industry  Limited (RCI) was established  for this purpose in 1958
and was subsequently  merged with the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) which was set up
in 1964.3
Thus industry was largely dependent on internal sources for finance.
For meeting the long- and medium-term  financial requirement of industry a number of
Government sponsored special development finance institutions (DFIs) -also known as "development
banks" -were established in the post-independence period 2. Policy makers were of the view that due
to imperfections in the capital markets, new enterprises, relatively smaller firms, and certain sectors
of industry did not have easy and adequate access to term finance and therefore needed special
attention. A second argument leading to the establishment of these special institutions was that there
was, in general, a shortage of finance and that such institutions were required for filling the gap.  In
the  Indian  case there was the additional objective that  both the amount and the allocation  of
investment be in accordance with plan priorities. Gupta (1969) identifies the following distinguishing
characteristics of these institutions:
1) They were restricted to providing finance for new investments in fixed assets.
2) Though they were expected to work on commercial lines they were also expected to pay "due
regard to the public interest" and work in accordance with the official plans.
3) They were not expected to compete with the traditional providers of finance and their role was that
of "gap fillers".
In addition to meeting the term finance requirements these DFIs were also expected to meet
the equity capital and foreign currency resource requirements of industry.  The role of these special
financial institutions has grown very significantly, particularly during the decade of the eighties, and
2  The first of these was the Industrial Finance Corporation  (IFC), established in 1948. This was
followed in 1951  with the setting up of regional institutions - the State Financial Corporations  (SFCs).
Subsequently, the National Industrial Development Corporation (NIDC) was set up in 1954 and the
Industrial  Credit and Investment Corporation  of India (ICICI) was floated in 1955 with sponsorship by
the World Bank. In 1964  the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) was established as an apex
institution  in the sphere of long- and medium-termn  finance.4
virtually all the finance provided by them goes to industry 3. In spite of their  "priority sector" 4
commitments  involving non-industrial  activities, approximately  50% of the commercial banks'
finance also goes to industry though commercial banks even today largely fulfill only the traditional
function of providing short-term finance for meeting working capital requirements.
The financial system has been characterized by an almost total lack of competition. The long
term lending business has very few players. In addition, because they are all publicly owned, the term
lending institutions have generally acted as a consortium and have the characteristics of a lending
cartel.  If a loan is turned down by the consortium then there is no option available to the potential
borrower.  Further, there is virtually no competition between the term lending institutions which
concentrate on medium- and long-term finance and the commercial banks with their emphasis on
working capital finance. With the nationalization of 14 large commercial banks in 1969 about 85%
of the assets of the banking system were under public control'.  Long term lending by commercial
banks has been restricted to  smaller enterprises and their share in consortium lending has been
restricted to 25%.
With the objective of maintaining low interest rates and directing credit towards certain
preferred sectors, there was till quite recently, a complex system of administered interest rates 6. In
the case of commercial banks both deposit and lending rates were regulated. Credit provided at lower
rates to the priority sectors is cross-subsidized by the traditional sectors.  The administered interest
3  Disbursal  of credit (at cunrent  prices) by the DFIs grew at the rate of 20% per annum during the
decade of the eighties whereas outstanding  bank credit to industry (at current prices) grew at an annual
average rate of 17% during the same period.
4  Commercial  banks are committed  to providing  40% of their finances  to "priority sectors" which,
in addition to agriculture and other non industrial activities, include small scale industry as well.
Approximately 30% of this is at concessional  rates of interest.
5  Other financial institutions (including life insurance companies) had been nationalized earlier.
All property insurance companies were taken over by the central government in 1971.
6  Since 1988 there has been some simplification  in the structure of administered  interest rates.5
rate structure was characterized by an inverted yield pattern with the long term lending rates being
lower than the minimum short-term lending rates of the commercial banks 7. As noted by the
Narsimhan Committee (1991  :p. 46): " The inverted yield pattern is largely a consequence of inflation
and the desire of the Government to shield long term investments from the penalty of high interest
rates caused by inflation". Although  the reasoning contained in the first part of this statement is not
compelling when applied to a relatively long period,  the statement itself  is indicative of the way in
which the problem of the inverted yield curve was being viewed.  DFIs provided credit at relatively
stable lending rates during the 1980's. The prime lending rate of the major DFIs during the 1980's
was 14% whereas the regular short term lending rates of commercial  banks were in the range of 16%-
19.5%. Inflation rates based on the Wholesale Price Index ranged from 4.5% to about 8% during the
period. Although the GDP deflator was somewhat higher, and ranged from 6.5%-9.3%, real interest
rates on non-concessional loans were positive. As the fiscal system has also encouraged debt finance
over equity Indian firms have been highly leveraged and dependent on the DFIs for their investment
needs.
Until the process of gradual de-regulation of the financial sector was begun during the late
1980's  both the mobilization and allocation of the economy's financial savings were heavily regulated.
For instance the entry of new banks, expansion of existing banks, and closure and location of bank
branches were tightly controlled.  In addition, interest rates on loans and deposits and the direction
of credit were also regulated and there existed wide interest rate differentials across sectors and  loan
sizes.  Firms' access to capital markets was also strictly regulated.  Regulations not withstanding,
over the last four decades there has been considerable widening and deepening of the Indian financial
system as can be seen from the improvements in the financial ratios reported in Table 1.
7  This relationship is now changing.6
Table 1
Financial Development Ratios
Ratio  1951-52  to  1966-67  to  1980-81  1989-90
1955-56  1968-69
Finance ratio (%)  4.9  13.8  32.7  43.9
Financial interrelation  ratio  0.63  0.93  1.93  2.50
Intermediation  ratio  0.27  0.33  0.41  0.45
Source: Rangarajan  and Jadhav (1992)
Notes: (I) Finance ratio = total financial claims/national  income;  (ii) Financial interrelation  ratio =
increase in stock of financial  claims/net capital formation;  (iii) Intermediation  ratio = claims issued
by financial institutions/ issues of non-financial sectors.
However, the fact that financial institutions are largely publicly owned and guided by so called
"public interest considerations" is likely to have led to serious incentive problems and to a mis-
allocation of resources.  These institutions are not under pressure to rush to foreclose a mortgage
when a borrower defaults. Thus loans are likely to be re-scheduled more often than if the financing
institution were guided purely by commercial motives. For this reason, liquidation even of  insolvent
firms was (and continues to be) quite rare in India. This tendency is reinforced by legislation that
makes liquidation and exit quite difficult. Moreover, there are also a large number of cases of perverse
loaning where loans are extended to firms that are insolvent and not viable.  For instance, in 1991 an
estimated 7% of bank lending was to medium and large "sick" units (see World Bank (1991)).  Such
lending merely finances the servicing of prior loans and extends the life of non-viable firms.  The
extent to which short term loans are often rolled over makes them indistinguishable in many cases
from long term loans.  Despite efforts over the last few years to reduce them, even today non-
performing assets (NPAs) form about 20% of the asset portfolio of commercial banks.  The NPA
burden of DFIs was and continues to be lower. The large burden of non-performing loans limits the7
volume of credit available for new or more viable enterprises.
In 1988/89 a process of gradual de-regulation of the financial sector was begun.  The process
for simplifying the administered structure of interest rates was initiated.  In October, 1988 ceilings
on interest  rates on advances of commercial banks were removed and only floors were specified.
Subsequently, this was extended to the interest rates on loans of the term lending institutions as well.
In addition, uniformnity  was introduced in interest rates across sectors and types of borrowers. Interest
rates were adjusted more frequently in accordance with the rate of inflation.  During 1988-89 the
Credit Authorization Scheme was replaced with a Credit Monitoring Arrangement. Thus, banks were
no longer required to obtain prior approval of the RBI for working capital advances and term loans,
provided they were made according to certain norms.  From October 1988 borrowers were permitted
to transfer their accounts from one bank to another without seeking the approval of the original bank
which introduced an element of competition into the system. Since 1991 the scope of the reform has
been considerably  widened.  Unfortunately the period covered by our panel does not allow us to
investigate the consequences of the more recent financial sector reforms.
III.  The Data: Description of the Panel and Aggregate Descriptive Statistics.
The data used in this study consist of selected variables from the annual balance sheets and
profit and loss accounts of an unbalanced panel of public limited companies 8 for the period 1980/81
to 1989/909. The firms represented in the sample have submitted their balance sheets voluntarily and,
therefore, the data do not allow any inference to be made regarding exit of firms. The fact that a firm
is not present in the data set after a few years does not necessarily imply that the frm  has left the
8  All the companies represented in the sample are non-financial companies in the private sector.
9  The financial year in India does not correspond to the calendar year.8
industry.
The original data set consisted of 16,147 observations and 2,521 firms were represented in it.
This study is based on a sub-set of the sample consisting of 13,552 observations and 2,149 firms'".
Short term and long term borrowing are distinguished in the data with loans of less than one year
maturity being classified as short term loans and the rest as long term loans.  The data allow us to
distinguish between borrowing from DFIs, borrowing from banks and market borrowing", and also
include trade dues and current liabilities.
Inferences drawn from this study may not be valid for the entire Indian corporate sector as the
sample  is drawn from  a sub-set of this  population  and also because the public sector plays a
significant role in India and its behaviour is governed by a set of rules different from those driving
the private sector. To the extent that the sample is representative of public limited companies (which
we believe is the case), the lessons drawn from this study are significant given the large role of public
limited companies in the Indian private sector' 2.
Before proceeding with the panel data analysis, in order to provide a more general and
complete picture, it is useful to present summary descriptive statistics for selected variables obtained
from aggregate (consolidated) balance sheet data.  These statistics are based on the consolidated
balance sheet data published in the Reserve Bank of India Bulletin (various issues) which cover both
10  Firms with zero or negative values for total output, fixed assets or the wage bill have been
dropped. Firms with no debt at all have also been excluded. Firms without  a continuous  time series have
not been included  and regressions  are based on firms with a continuous presence of at least four years.
"  For this purpose we have classified debentures (bonds) held by banks and DFIs as market
borrowing.
12  The role of public limited  companies  in the Indian corporate  sector,  the representativeness  of this
sample and the effects of industrial reform have been discussed in detail in Srivastava (1996). Details
regarding the data set, including the deflation of variables and creation of the capital series, are also
available in that study.9
public limited and private limited companies 13. (Our panel only contains data for public limited
companies). Separate data are available for both these classes of firms. Private limited (closely held)
companies are typically smaller. Separate data are also available for large public limited companies' 4.
The large companies are a sub-set of the sample of public limited companies.  There is a significant
size difference between the three categories of firms.  The average paid up capital of the large public
limited companies is Rs. 62 million whereas the average paid up capital for the full sample of public
limited companies for the same period is slightly less than Rs. 35 million.  For the sample of private
limited companies the average size of the paid up capital is considerably smaller and is approximately
Rs. 2.4 million compared to just under Rs. 22 million for the public limited companies for the same
period.
On the basis of the data presented in Table 2 the following generalizations can be made:
1)  The current ratio, which is an indicator of liquidity (working capital availability), is positively
correlated  with  size.  As per accounting norms a current ratio between  1.2 - 2.0 is considered
satisfactory" 5. The lower current ratio for the small (closely held) firms suggests that these firms
might be relatively strapped for long term finance, and divert short term finance for the purpose.  In
absolute terms even the current ratio for the larger firms is at the lower end of the acceptable range.
The fact that smaller firns  are characterized by a tighter liquidity position is also confirmed by the
fact that the ratio of net working capital to fixed assets plus currents assets (gross working capital)
is significantly lower for the small firms.
13  Private limited companies are distinguished from public limited companies by the fact that the
maximum  number of shareholders  in the former is limited  to 50 persons  and their shares are non-traded.
These restrictions do not apply to public limited companies.
'4  These are companies with a paid up capital of over Rs. 10 million.
15  See for example UNIDO (1978).10
Table 2
Selected Financial  Ratios
for the Aggregate  Data
Pvt Ltd. Co.s  Pub. Ltd. Co.s  Large Co.s
1984-1986  1987-1989
1984-1986  1987-1989
Current Ratio  (cr)  1.08  1.21  1.24  1.32
nwc/K  (liq)  0.052  0.092  0.107  0.132
Cash flow/K  (cfk)  0.055  0.051  0.054  0.062
L.t. Borrowing/Total Borrowing  0.343  0.656  0.656  0.691
(matl)
L.t. Borrowing/Total Borrowing  0.165  0.383  0.402  0.426
(including trade dues) (mat2)
Fixed assets/K (assm)  0.273  0.463  0.445  0.455
Bank Borrowing/Total Borrowing  0.619  0.380  0.372  0.335
(banktb)
D.F.I. Borrowing /Total  0.108  0.247  0.271  0.253
Borrowing (dfitb)
D.F.I. Borrowing/Total  U.t.  0.316  0.376  0.413  0.392
borrowing (dfiltb)
S.t.  Bank Borrowing/  0.835  0.780  0.801  0.799
Total Bank Borrowing
Total Borrowing/K (lev)  0.374  0.397  0.440  0.421
L.t. Borrowing/Fixed assets  0.470  0.563  0.648  0.640
L.t. Borrowing/Equity  0.583  0.827  0.962  0.874
Trade dues etc./Total Liabilities  0.395  0.275  0.267  0.251
S.t Borrowing/Inventories  0.776  0.534  0.601  0.529
Notes:(I) s.t.=short term; (ii) l.t.=long term; (iii) D.F.I.s =  Devt. Finance Institutions; (iv) Current Ratio =
Current Assets (CA)/Current Liabilities (CL); (v) CA = Inventories + Loans and advances and other
debtor balances + Book value of Quoted Investments + Cash and Bank Balances + Advance of Income
Tax; ((vi) CL = Tax and other current provisions + s.t. Bank borrowing + s.t. other borrowing + Trade
dues and other current liabilities; (vii) NWC = CA - CL; (viii) K = Fixed assets + Current Assets; (ix) L.t.
borrowing = Borrowing from all D.F.I.s + Borrowing from govt./semi-govt. bodies + Borrowing from
companies + L.t. borrowing from banks and others; (x) S.t. borrowing = Total borrowing - U.t.  borrowing;
(xi) Equity = Paid up capital + forfeited shares + reserves and surplus; (xii) Inventories = Raw materials,
components etc. + Finished goods + Work-in-progress + Stores & spares + Misc.; (xiii) Trade dues etc. =
Trade dues and current liabilities; (xiv) Cash flow = accounting profits + depreciation.I1
2) The total debt to total assets ratio is higher for the larger firms, but the difference is not ver large.
This is because the ratio of short term borrowing to gross working capital is higher for the small firms
as indicated by the ratio of short term debt to inventories. However, the ratio of long term borrowing
to fixed assets is significantly lower for the smaller firms, which also suggests that the smaller firms
find it more difficult to access long term finance.  The debt-equity ratio also shows that larger firms
are more leveraged than the small firms.  However, of  the total liabilities of the small firms almost
40% are in the form of trade dues and current liabilities whereas these form only 25-27% of the total
liabilities of the larger firms".
3)  For the smaller firms almost two-thirds of their non trade debt consists of short term borrowing
whereas for the larger furms  the situation is quite the reverse, with two-thirds of their borrowing being
long-term (see matl  which gives the percentage of long term debt relative to total debt, excluding
trade dues). If trade dues are included in total borrowing, short term debt represents more than 80%
of total debt for small firms, versus 57% for large firms (see mat2).  This also suggests that access
to long-term finance is harder for small firms.  The maturity structure of debt matches the maturity
structure of assets as represented by the ratio of fixed assets to total assets which is 27.3% for the
small firms and about 45% for the larger firms.
4)  When one compares the large firms with the entire set of public limited companies, there appears
to be a positive relationship between the cash flow ratio and the debt maturity ratio.  If the cash flow
ratio  is interpreted as a performance measure, then this suggests a positive correlation between
performance and maturity. However, the result is quite weak as the difference between the maturity
structure of the debt of the large firms and of all public limited companies is small. Comparison
16  Trade dues and current liabilities are not included in the definition of total borrowing unless
specifically indicated.12
between the sample of small firms and the sample of all public limited companies does not indicate
such a relationship.
5)  A much larger share of the smaller firms' borrowing is from banks (62%) rather than from the
development finance institutions (11%).  Since the special financial institutions provide only term
loans, while banks in India largely provide short term finance, this also suggests that access to term
finance may be harder for the small firms.
IV.  Empirical Evidence on Maturity using Panel Data.
In this section we discuss the empirical evidence on the maturity structure of debt using firm
level panel data. We first present some descriptive statistics and simple bivariate correlations  and then
discuss the econometric evidence on the determinants of maturity.
IV.I  Descriptive Statistics for the Panel and Simple Correlations
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the panel of firms.  Looking at the (weighted) mean
values of the two measures of the maturity composition of debt (mat 1 and mat2), we see that they are
virtually identical to those presented in Table 2 using the aggregate data for public limited companies.
Approximately 39% of the total stock of debt (inclusive of trade debt) is represented by long term
debt and 37% of this long term debt comes from development finance institutions.  Bank finance
accounts for 37% of all debt and approximately 27% of all debt is arm's length debt. The time series
of debt maturity for the balanced panel (not reported in the table) indicates an increase during the
period in the share of long term debt held by firms in the sample. There is also evidence of a decline
in the share of bank finance and an increase in the share of finances provided by DFIs.13
Table 3
Selected variables: data averages & correlations for the panel
___.,_.,._|_|  Correlation of the variables in the first column with:
Variable  Mean  matl  mat2  mktbtb  dfitb
matl  .6556  1.00  .834  .380  .545
mat2  .3897  .834  1.00  .195  .589
assm  .5683  .459  .596  -.058  .492
cfk  .0422  .137  .097  .154  .031
lev  .3208  .056  .298  -.241  .192
liq  .0817  .156  .117  .316  -.077
cr  1.23  .243  .258  .303  -.029
banktb  .3744  -.637  -.557  -.383  -.546  l
dfitb  .2413  .545  .589  -.186  1.00
dfiltb  .3681  .153  .262  -.383  .830
mktbtb  .2704  .380  .195  1.00  -.186
Iprod  11.10  .219  .138  .377  .028
Innk  10.65  .440  .445  .313  .289
Ishrk  9.14  .375  .360  .358  .225
Notes: (I) mktbtb = (borrowing against debentures + borrowing from the public)/total borrowing; (ii)
Iprod = log of output; (iii) lnnk = log of net capital stock; (iv) Ishrk = log of share capital; (v) matl  =
LTB/TB; (vi) mat2=LTB/ (TB+Trade dues); (vii) for definitions of other variables see footnotes to
Table 2; (viii) "means" are ratios of sums except for means of Iprod, Innk and Ishrk; (ix) the means
are weighted means using the denominator of the ratio for weighting.
Before proceeding to a comprehensive econometric analysis of the determinants of maturity,
we discuss some interesting bivariate correlations between maturity structure and  selected variables
(see the last four columns of Table 3).  There is a marked positive correlation between the share of
long term debt in the loan portfolio of firms and the share of fixed assets in the asset portfolio.  This
matching of the composition of debt and assets supports the prediction of Hart and Moore's (1994)
model and is in conformity with the conventional wisdom that term loans should finance longer lived
assets.
The association between profitability (as measured by the ratio  of cash flow to fixed assets -14
cfk ) and the maturity composition of firm debt is positive but weak.  Cash flow can be treated as an
indicator of a firm's quality and credit worthiness.  The theory suggests that there is a complex and
possibly non-monotonic relationship between a firm's quality and the maturity structure of its debt.
From Diamond's (1991) model it emerges that firms at the lowest end of the quality spectrum will
only be able to borrow short term. As firms' credit worthiness increases, they find it both optimal and
possible to use long term debt. However, more highly rated firms would again choose short term debt
in order to take advantage of  the revelation of future good news.  If this positive information effect
outweighs the risk of being liquidated by opportunistic lenders,  a non-monotonic relationship between
firm quality and maturity composition would result. It is not clear however that this, and other similar
theoretical models", are entirely relevant in the Indian context as these models implicitly or explicitly
assume the existence of profit maximizing lenders and credible threats of liquidation. The public
ownership of banks and  the multifarious demands placed on them makes these assumptions rather
dubious in the Indian context. In a situation where financial institutions are reluctant to foreclose and
loans  are routinely rolled over, short term debt may not  be an effective disciplining device as
envisaged in these models.  Moreover, these models assume a competitive market structure, while,
as noted earlier, Indian financial markets were characterized by a marked lack of competition during
the period of the study.
To the extent that firms are threatened by liquidation and to the extent that there is some
liquidation risk associated with short term debt (although not as high as in an economy in which
financial intermediaries are guided purely by profit considerations), the positive correlation between
maturity (mat2) and leverage can be explained by firms taking on more long term debt to hedge
against the enhanced liquidation risk associated with a higher degree of leveraging. It is interesting
17  On this issue of maturity choice see also Myers (1977) and Diamond (1993).15
however to note that, whereas higher leveraging is positively associated with borrowing from DFIs,
it is negatively associated with market borrowing.
The positive correlation that maturity has with the current ratio (defined as the ratio of current
assets to current liabilities) and, to a  lesser extent, with liquidity is consistent with long term finance
going to firms with a more solid balance sheet position. It may also suggest that firms are able to get
less term finance than they desire, and when this happens a squeeze is put on working capital.  This
inference is also supported by the negative correlation' 8 (-.324) between asset composition and
liquidity which  suggests that when the longer maturity composition of assets is not adequately
supported by long term debt, pressure is put on working capital.
The positive correlations of maturity with share capital and the capital stock (in logs) indicate
that the collateralized value of assets and the level of equity are important for lenders' financing
decision.  Further  evidence in support of this conclusion is provided by the positive correlation
between the level of market borrowing and finance from DFIs with share capital,  the capital stock
and output. Though DFI finance is also positively related to share capital and the fixed capital stock,
it has no correlation with output.  The ability to access arm's length funds appears to be positively
related to size'9.
A more complete discussion of the determinants of maturity is deferred until the discussion
of the regression results.
IV.2  Econometric Evidence on Maturity
Although  the preceding discussion has provided some explanation for the determinants of
IS  Not reported  in the table.
19  See Rajan (1992) on the choice between bank finance and arm's length finance.
The main implication of the model is that as the quality of high quality firms improves, they will
issue more arm's length debt if the market for short term finance is not competitive.16
maturity, for a better understanding it is important to see how some of these variables jointly explain
maturity.  For this purpose we have estimated two different versions of a maturity equation, the
results of which are reported in Table 4. The explanatory variables include lagged maturity, the
maturity structure of assets,  leverage, cash flow, liquidity, and the log of the capital stock as a
measure of firm size.  We have experimented with different timing of the regressors.  In particular,
leverage and liquidity have been entered either as beginning of period or end of period values.  The
maturity equation, particularly when end of period values of stock variables are used as regressors,
should be thought of as one structural equation that is part of a more general system determining at
least firms' financial choices (and possibly real ones as well). Since we focus on just one equation,
our analysis is obviously a partial one.  Moreover, one must take into account the endogeneity that
results from the simultaneity of  such choices.  Endogeneity also results from measurement errors,
and in any case one must allow for time invariant-firm specific components of the error term. For this
reasons we have estimated the equation in first differences, using the Generalized Method of Moment
(GMM) approach (see Arellano and Bond (1988) and (1992)), using appropriately lagged values of
the variables as instruments. All equations include year dummies.
The multivariate regression results tend to support the conclusions based on the bivariate
correlations of the previous section. Lagged maturity has a strong positive influence on maturity
today. This is not surprising since much and immediate within-firm variation in maturity is unlikely.
The second important effect is that of asset composition on maturity, showing that firms tend to match
the maturity structure of  assets and liabilities.  Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1996) also report
similar results for the U.K. and Italy and Jaramillo and Schiantarelli (1996) for Ecuador.  Liquidity
also has a strong positive influence on maturity.  This is consistent with healthier balance sheet
conditions increasing the access to long term finance. It is also consistent with the availability of long17
term finance being associated with the ability to maintain adequate levels of working capital.  As the
liquidity variable is an indicator of the adequacy of working capital this suggests that firms in India
may face  a  shortage of term  finance.  The positive  coefficient on leverage also confirms our
preliminary conclusion that highly leveraged firrns rely more on long term funds to hedge against the
liquidity risk arising from a high degree of leveraging. However, when one period lagged leverage
and liquidity are used as regressors the coefficients are smaller and statistically insignificant.  The
influence of lagged cash flow on maturity choice is somewhat weak and ambiguous.  Similar results
are obtained if contemporaneous cash flow is used instead.
The estimates of the capital stock coefficient indicate that size has a negative effect on
maturity, which is in contradiction with what the bivariate correlations indicated 20. One explanation
could be  that  fixed capital stock is strongly correlated with asset composition and, controlling for
this, the impact of size on maturity is negative, though of a relatively small magnitude. Alternatively,
considering that our sample does not contain the tail of the most informationally  disadvantaged firms,
this results may reflect the fact that  larger (and better)  firms may find it optimal to use short term
debt for the reasons outlined in Diamond  (1981).  However, we have already  expressed our
reservations  about a mechanical application of the theoretical models of maturity to the Indian
context, because of the nature of financial intermediaries.
20  Similar results are obtained if share capital or output is used as the size variable.18
Table 4
MATURITY  EQUATIONS
dep var:  Eq.1  Eq.2
mat2  1  st DIFF  1  st DIFF
l  _______________  GMM-I.V.  GMM-I.V.
mat2_ 1 .394(11.74)  .501(11.47)
assm  .672(8.22)  .484(5.31)
ctk- 1 -.029(-0.59)  .005(0.09)
liq  .279(7.41)
liq,_  .020(0.47)
lev  .300(6.82)
lev__  .035(0.82)
lncap  -.082(-4.42)  -.056(-2.76)
constt  .011(3.19)  .009(2.34)
waldl(d.f)  578.59(6)  424.13(6)
wald2(d.f)  34.07(8)  34.20(8)
2nd order serial corr.  0.409  0.289
(p value)  (.682)  (.773)
Sargan(d.f)  167.19(157)  170.54(156)
obs  8739  8739
period  1982-89  1982-89
Notes: (1) t statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors which are robust to heteroscedasticity;  (ii) the minimum  lag length  of the
instruments is 3 and the choice of specification  is based on the value of the Sargan statistic; (iv) waldI for regressors;  (v) wald2 for time
dummies; (iii) time dunmnies  have been included but are not reported.
V.  Maturity and Performance
In this section we test whether the conventional wisdom that term finance is important for19
firm performance is borne out by the data 2t. To do this we first present some summary statistics
relating the share of long term debt in total debt at the beginning of year to the average cash flow
to capital ratio (avcfk) and the average rate of growth of output (avgout) calculated over the three
year period from t to t+2 22. We then estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function to isolate the
impact of maturity and other related variables on firm level total factor productivity (TFP).
In the first exercise, the data have been sorted by firm-year observations into quartiles
based on beginning of period (end of last period) maturity.  The within quartile averages (and
standard deviations) for maturity and the performance variables are presented in Table 5.  There
is a very large variation in the maturity structure of debt, with firms in the lowest quartile holding
under 5% of their debt portfolio in the form of long term debt, to the share of long term debt being
over  57% for firms in the top quartile.  There is evidence of a positive correlation between
maturity and both the cash flow ratio and the rate of growth of output.  The average cash flow
ratio  for the firms in the top quartile is more than three times that of the firms in the lowest
maturity  class  while the  average rate  of growth  of  output for the  high  maturity  firms  is
(approximately) 8% versus  1% for the lowest maturity firms.  Thus the bivariate correlations
provide some evidence suggesting that a higher share of term finance has a positive impact on a
firm's performance in terms of profitability and sale growth.  It is, of course, also possible that
better firms are able to attract more long term finance. The issue of causality is better taken care
of with the regression analysis.
21  See Calomiris and Himmelberg  (1  995) for a detailed analysis of subsidized  credit for
machine tool producers in Japan.
22  The rate of investment is defined as the ratio of investment to the net capital stock.20
Table 5
MATURITY AND PERFORMANCE
(Data sorted by maturity)
Below Ist  Ist to 2nd  2nd to 3rd  Above 3rd  Correlation  with
quartile  quartile  quartile  quartile  last period
maturity
avcfkc  .01245  .02807  .03805  .03803  .128
(.08662)  (.06934)  (.05777)  (.05798)
avgout  .01093  .02822  .05865  .08745  .150
(.22828)  (.19935)  (.17853)  (.21804)
Notes: (1)  avgout,  = (In q%+ 2 -In qt, 1)/3; (ii) avcflc,  = (cfk, + cfl,,  + cfl, 2)/3; (iv) standard  deviation in
parentheses.
In order to investigate in more detail a channel that may explain the improved performance
in terms of profitability and sales growth of firms with more initial long term finance, we will
investigate the impact of maturity (and other related variables) on firm level  TFP.  More
specifically, we assume the existence of a  production function,
where Q, K, L, and M are output, capital stock, labour and materials and eh0 is the firm specific
productivity parameter, Xi, is the vector of financial variables which are expected to influence
productivity and I and t are firm and time subscripts. The production function is assumed to be
Cobb-Douglas and  h(.) is parameterized as a linear function. The estimating equation is:21
In  et)  ' "h(i,  t,X"_p,(-K)  L  P2 (-)+P3ii(,K),  e,,
where h(.) Is parameterized as,
Estimates for different combinations of the variables in X are presented in Tables 6 and
7.  The two tables differ with regard to the timing for the financial variables. 23 The coefficient on
maturity and the coefficient on the share of financing by DFIs are both positive and statistically
significant  in most  cases.  The estimates suggest that the impact of market  (arm's  length)
borrowing is negative though the estimates in this case are not statistically significant 24. Higher
leveraging clearly has a negative impact on productivity and the effect of current period liquidity
is unanbiguously  positive.
What does the overall evidence tell us about the influence that the debt-equity and debt-
maturity choices have on productivity? The positive coefficients on maturity and the share of DFI
debt support the traditional view that scarcity of term finance could have adverse effects on firm
performance.  This could be because more productive technologies may not be adopted unless
they provide an immediate payoff. In other terms the "quality" of fixed capital may be adversely
affected 25. Moreover, the lack of term finance may lead firms to use a smaller amnount  of working
capital than would be optimal from the point of view of the production process.
23  In Table 6 we present  estimates  where end of period  values are used for the variables in X, while
in Table 7 beginning of period values are used for the variables in X.
24  Recall though that market borrowing includes debentures held by banks and DFIs.
25  The capital stock variable included in the equation is calculated using the standard perpetual
inventory method, starting from a benchmark calculated revaluing for inflation the accounting value
of the capital stock (see Srivastava  (1996) for details). The maturity  variable  can be thought  as applying
a quality adjustment  to these capital stock figures.22
Table 6
PRODUCTIVITY  EQUATIONS  - I
In(Q/K),O  a,+r(Xk  1 ln(L/K)e N 2 I  (MIK)eNllnK+er
Eq.:  Eq. 2:  Eq. 3:
X, = fmat,, levy.]  XN  = (matt, ley,,, liqj  X1 ,=[dfitb,,,mktbtbft,Iev,,Iiqj
mat2  .156(4.30)  .148(4.26)
dfitb  .080(2.97)
mktbtb  -. 037(-1.38)
lev  -.120(-2.64)  -.120(-3.18)  -.039(-1.17)
liq  _  __  _  .063(2.81)  .077(3.44)
In K  .056(2.75)  .057(3.23)  .076(4.34)
In (L/K)  .128(4.13)  .135(5.19)  .180(7.27)
In (M/K)  .918(45.32)  .907(54.79)  .882(55.19)
constant  -.050(-5.26)  -.052(-5.65)  *.053(-5.72)
waldl(d.f)  4592.14(5)  6381.02(6)  11143.0(6)
wald2(d.f)  81.29(9)  102.16(9)  248.55(8)
2nd order  -1.70  -1.66  -1.59
serial corr.  (.089)  (.097)  (.112)
(p value)
Sargan(d.f.)  187.30(170)  219.16(204)  248.6(238)
R 2 _
obs.  10305  10305  10305
period  1981-89  1981-89  1981-89
Notes: (I) su,  = a + AA,;(ii)  waid] is for the slope coefficients;  (iii) wald2 is for the time dummies, (iv) t statistics in parentheses  are based on
robust standard errors; (vi) ninimum lag length for instrmments  used is 2.23
Table 7
PRODUCTIVITY  EQUATIONS -II
Kn(QI)  s,-.r(X,,)'  4ln(L/K)eP2nMlK)ep3lnneK
Eq.  :  Eq.2:  Eq.3:
l=  [matj, 1 , 1ev 1,]  Xi,  = [mat,,  levi,.1,  liqi,1]  X1j=dtitb),,mktbtbf,,lev,,liqI,.,]
rmat2. 1 .052(1.03)  .174(3.57)
dfitb,l  .157(3.70)
mktbtb.,  .033(0.84)
lev-,  -.129(-1.81)  -.224(-3.92)  -.055(-1.55)
liq-,  -.236(-4.92)  -.125(-3.04)
In K  .050(1.52)  .069(2.46)  .120(4.16)
In (L/K)  .127(2.70)  .127(3.36)  .202(5.60)
In (M/K)  .914(29.92)  .932(36.88)  .889(33.15)
constant  -.014(-3.32)  -.017(-3.89)  -.019(-4.34)
waldl(d.f)  5922.40(5)  6243.62(6)  5082.13(7)
wald2(d.f.)  42.99(8)  62.57(8)  68.89(9)
2nd  order  -3.07  -3.22  -3.11
serial  corr.  (.002)  (.001)  (.002)
(p value)
Sargan(d.f.)  142.18(130)  171.7(156)  172.28(182)
R 2 _  :
obs.  8739  8739  8739
period  1982-89  1982-89  1982-89
Notes:  (I) sh =  a + A).,;(ii)  waldl is for  the slope coefficients;  (iii) wald2 is for  the time  dummies;  (iv) t statistics  in  parentheses  are  based on
robust  standard  errors;  (vi) minimum  lag length  of instruments  used is 3 due to the  existence  of second  order  serial  correlation.
The production  function results provide no evidence to support the view that short term debt is
superior.  With a non-competitive market for short term debt in which criteria other than profit
maximization determine the behaviour of financial intermediaries, and with an administered interest
rate structure there is perhaps little reason for firms to prefer short term debt.  With an inverted yield24
pattern firms would, all else being equal, no doubt, prefer long term debt because it is cheaper and
also because it carries a lower liquidation threat.  For the same reasons it is also unlikely that more
short term debt forces better performance.  In this situation a lack of term finance is only likely to
adversely  affect the  quality  of  fixed  capital and  to  put  pressure  on  a firm's  working  capital
requirements, which leads to poor performance. The positive association with end of period liquidity
lends support to the latter conclusion.
It  is  not  immediately obvious why leveraging has a  negative impact on productivity 26.
Actually the attempt to avoid bankruptcy may force firms to be more efficient.  However, it is
possible that with more leveraging the moral hazard problem is exacerbated and there may be fewer
incentives for controlling-shareholders  to strive for efficiency since they reap a smaller fraction of the
rewards. If it is true that term financing by DFIs positively influences productivity, then it must be
the increased leveraging from arm's length and short term sources that adversely affect performance.
TIhis  is supported by the fact that the magnitude of the negative effect of leveraging is less when we
control for market borrowing (results not reported). Another explanation for the negative sign of the
leverage coefficient is that since rehabilitation packages and re-financing are common for so called
"sick" firms, high leveraging may indicate an inherently bad firm/project, if differencing is not
enough to control for this unobserved characteristic. Moreover, an  increase in leveraging without
a congruous increase in maturity could imply a shortage of working capital with its adverse impact
on performance. This possibility is supported by the fact that the negative coefficient on the leverage
ratio  is reduced when we control only for liquidity and becomes greater when only maturity is
controlled for. Lastly, since Indian firms rely largely on institutional finance for their investment
needs, growth-oriented (good?) firms looking for fresh financing would try to align their debt-equity
26  Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1996) find this to be true for the U.K. as well.  Nickell and
Nicolitsas (1995) find the opposite to be true for the U.K. when using a flow measure of indebtedness.25
ratios with acceptable norms whereas non-growth-oriented (bad?) firms would not be subject to this
pressure.  The negative coefficient on leveraging may be reflecting this.2'
VI. Conclusions
State supported term lending institutions, particularly in developing countries, have been
created with  the objective of providing (often subsidized) access to term finance for industrial
borrowers.  As a contribution to evaluating this strategy, this paper has explored empirically the
determinants and consequences of the maturity structure of debt, using firm level panel data.
The analysis reveals that one of the most important determinants of debt maturity is asset
composition with a higher proportion of fixed assets in the asset mix supporting higher maturity debt.
The positive  coefficient on the working capital (liquidity) variable in the maturity equation  is
consistent with term finance going to firms with the healthier balance sheet position.  It may also
suggest that firms face term finance constraints.  Everything else equal, the effect of cash flow on
maturity is weak, although the bivariate association is positive but not large. There is some evidence
in the maturity equation to suggest that larger firms prefer a debt composition with relatively less long
term debt, though the bivariate association between size and length of maturity is positive.
Although the results in this paper are not conclusive, they seem to support the conventional
27  The adverse consequences of high leveraging have also been mentioned by the
Narsimhan Committee (1991) in its report.  At p. 102 of its report the committee notes: "While
the liberal lending norms, particularly the high leverage in the form of a debt equity of 2:1 did
indeed  help in attracting new entrepreneurs, it acted as a deterrent in making the projects
financially viable particularly in the context of fiscal and market uncertainties.  In a way this
could be attributed to the fiscal system which favoured debt rather than equity as a source of
investment financing as a result of which most of the projects were seriously undercapitalised
thereby affecting their ability to withstand difficult times."26
beliefs  concerning  the importance of term  finance for firm performance.  Longer maturity  is
positively associated with subsequent higher profitability and output growth.  Moreover estimation
of a Cobb Douglas production function, augmented with financial variables, suggests that the share
of long term finance and DFI finance have a positive influence on firm level productivity. This could
be because the availability of term finance may have favourable effects on the quality of fixed capital
accumulation,  in  the sense of allowing  access to better  technologies.  Another  explanation  is
suggested by the positive impact of liquidity on performance.  Firms facing a shortage of long terrn
finance are likely to divert working capital to meet their terrm  finance requirements which leads to
poor performance.  High leveraging, however, has a strong negative impact on productivity. This
finding is important and has obvious implications for fiscal policies that encourage debt and also for
the financing norms of financial institutions.
It is important to note that the data on which these results are based have been generated by
a financial system which is marked by a lack of competition, and in which the financial institutions
are state owned and not guided by the profit motive. In addition, in this system financial institutions
have virtually no control over interest rates.  In view of these facts, the counter-factual question as
to whether short term finance would be more beneficial in a less regulated system, with greater
flexibility for all the players, cannot be addressed. In any event, the observed benefits of term finance
must be weighed against the costs. At the end of the decade of the eighties the capital base of a large
number of the government owned financial institutions in India (both banks and DFIs) was severely
eroded, their financial position was poor and they carried a large burden of non-performing assets.
Further  research on the issues addressed in this paper, using data that also cover the period after the
introduction of financial sector reforms, would be very beneficial.27
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